Internet of ings (IoT) is characterized by various of heterogeneous devices and facing numerous threats. Modeling security of IoT is still a certain challenge. is paper de nes a Stochastic Colored Petri Net (SCPN) for IoT-based smart environment and then proposes a Markov Game model for security situational awareness (SSA) in the de ned SCPN. All possible a ack paths are computed by the SCPN, and antagonistic behavior of both a ackers and defenders are taken into consideration dynamically according to Game eory. Two a ack scenarios in smart home environment are taken into consideration to demonstrate the e ectiveness of the proposed model. e proposed model can form a macroscopic trend curve of security situation. Analysis of the results shows the capabilities of the proposed model in nding vulnerable devices and potential a ack paths, and even mitigating the impact of a acks. To our knowledge, this is the rst a empt to establish a dynamic SSA model for a complex IoT-based smart environment.
INTRODUCTION
Internet of ings (IoT) de nes a communication network that consist of highly interconnected heterogeneous devices [1] . IoT comes from the expansion of the Internet, which is destined to inherit most the security issues of the Internet. At the same time, new security issues occur to the IoT due to the numerous devices act as sensors [2] . IoT is still in the stage of development with no uniform standards for the hardware, so ware and communication protocols [3] . A variety of smart scenarios is also heterogeneous, which makes the defense of IoT extremely complicated. In order to perform a more e ective and active defense as well as making defense decisions quickly when a acks happen, we are in expectation of real-time SSA of IoT-based environment.
Compared with the traditional SSA in the Internet, modeling SSA in IoT confronts the following challenges: (1) e SSA models in the Internet rely on the static network topology. However, the devices in IoT are ambulatory, which tend to a dynamic topology. (2) A SSA model in the Internet always has a uni ed communication protocol while various communication protocols exist in IoT system simultaneously and the devices communicate with others through their own protocols. (3) e SSA models in the Internet fail to consider the susceptibility of devices such as ba ery power consumption, while in IoT system the susceptibility should be stressed because some passive a acks caused by low power consumption o en occur such as automatic sleep.
Due to the challenges mentioned above, using the existing cyber security models [4] to achieve the purpose of real-time SSA in IoT is impossible. Several papers focus on developing security model for the IoT. Some of these papers [5] [6] [7] consider the vulnerabilities existence in IoT devices and propose a framework based on the network topology, but ignore the interaction between a ackers and defenders caused by the o ensive and defensive strategies changes in the process. Others [8, 9] construct game-based security models for the IoT. However, their scope always address on some related issues in speci c elds such as power consumption and consumer choice. Previous researches do not form a global, systematic and complete model for SSA, but instead mainly considers the security of IoT from certain domains.
is paper de nes a SCPN for IoT-based smart environment by extending the basic Petri Net.
en proposes a Markov Game model for SSA in the de ned SCPN. Smart home environment is used to test the proposed model and two a ack scenarios in the smart home are taken into consideration. e proposed model can simulate the curve of overall security situation. From the comparison of the curves under the two a ack scenarios, we can nd vulnerable devices and the potential a ack paths related to them and mitigate the impact of a acks through modifying defense strategy.
e contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: Figure 1 : A typical Stochastic Colored Petri Net, which comprises of places (circles), transitions (rectangles), directed connections and colored tokens (dots).
-We de ne a SCPN for IoT-based smart environment where colored tokens represent di erent types of threats.
reats propagation between IoT devices are captured by transitions, making the a ack scenarios be er exhibited, especially for collaborative a acks caused by various threats.
-We considered the interaction of strategy changes between the a ackers and defenders in the a ack-defense process, which makes the proposed model more applicable to the real smart environment.
-To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst a empt to use Markov Game eory in IoT-based SCPN to establish a SSA model for a complex smart environment. e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces methodology to develop the model. Section 3 describes a smart home environment with two a ack scenarios in detail, provides experimental results and evaluates the performance of our model. Section 4 discusses some relevant issues of our approach. Section 5 concludes the paper.
METHODOLOGY
is section provides a methodological and theoretical basis for the concepts used in the paper.
Stochastic Colored Petri Nets
Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) is suitable for modeling the dynamic behavior of any complex system [10] . CPN has colored tokens, which can describe various types of data and operations [11] . In IoT-based smart environment, a ackers usually use synergistic a acks to achieve a ack goals, which makes various threats propagate in the IoT. In this paper, we add colored tokens (represent di erent threats) to the SPN to expand it to a SCPN. Figure 1 shows a typical SCPN.
SCPN is de ned as 6-tuple:
e components of SCPN are: -Assets (A) are valuable resources in the smart environment, such as IoT devices and routers. Several vulnerabilities may be in these assets.
-Colored Tokens (T ) represent di erent types of threats. ere may be multiple tokens in one place. More tokens indicate that the corresponding node has been subjected to a more serious a ack, and the node is more likely to a ect other nodes. T * denotes one of the threats in the smart environment.
-Places (P) are all the possible locations of IoT nodes in the net. IoT nodes a ected by a threat T * include nodes that have been a acked or may be a acked, expressed as Node T * = P 1 T * , ..., P i T * . -Directed Connections (C) are located between places and transitions, indicating the directions of threat propagation.
e propagation path of a threat T * is expressed as
-reat subnet ( ) contains all the a ected nodes and propagation paths associated with these nodes. e threat subnet of T * is expressed as T * = (Node T * , Path T * ).
-Transitions (T R) indicate the propagation of threats. When a transition occurs, the token moves from a node to another. T R ξ denotes the probability of threats propagating between two nodes successfully.
Markov Game Model
Game eory (GT) captures the nature of con icts: determination of the a acking-force strategies is tightly coupled to determination of the defense-force strategies [13] . Markov Decision Process (MDP) refers to the process that a decisionmaker selects the behavior from the available behavior set based on the present state at each moment [14, 15] . Markov Game is a combination of GT and MDP. e state at the next moment is only relevant to the current moment, so the threat transition has Markov properties. We establish a Markov Game model in the de ned SCPN. e proposed model is de ned as 5-tuple:
e components of the model are: -Players (λ) set contains an a acker and a defender in this game. e a acker (λ A ) spreads T * for damaging the performance of the system and the defender (λ D ) cuts o the propagation paths of T * to keep the whole system stable.
-State Space (S) consists of all the possible states of T * . e system states are determined by previous states and the current actions. e state of the i th node at time τ is µ i (τ ).
e state of the j th propagation path at time τ is η j (τ ). e overall state of T * at time τ is T * (τ ) = µ i (τ ) , η j (τ ) .
-Action Space (Ω) includes all the possible combinations of actions in the game. At every time step, each player chooses strategies with associated actions. e a acker's action (Ω t ) is propagating threat with a certain probability. e defender's action (Ω ) is to perform the strategy such as xing a vulnerability, cu ing o a propagation path, or removing a IoT node.
-Transition Rules (Φ). e purpose of Φ is to calculate the probability distribution over the state space (S). e variation of the state is described by:
where Ω t (τ ) denotes the action of the a acker at time τ , Ω (τ ) denotes the action of the defender at time τ .
-Reward function ( ). Since the purpose of the a acker is to maximize damage of the SCPN, its reward function is in relation to the damage. e purpose of the defender is to minimize the damage of the SCPN, its reward function is in relation to the reduced damage.
Game Process
Game Process involves how players make decisions under the interaction of each other and selects strategies from Ω according to the current state, and then get the one-step reward.
For the a acker, T * damages node i and its associated propagation paths. e one-step reward function at time τ is expressed as:
where, i ∈ o is the nodes a ected by T * , j ∈ path i is the propagation paths related to node i. t µ i (τ ) denotes the damage of the node i, j ∈pat h i t η j (τ ) denotes the damage of the propagation paths related to node i.
For the defender, taking security strategy will bring two e ects: reducing the damage produced by T * and a ecting network performance inevitably.
µ i (τ ) denotes the variation of the node i a er taking security strategy.
j ∈pat h i η j (τ ) denotes the variation of paths related node i. e one-step reward function at time τ is expressed as:
e threat propagates to the uninfected node through the T * , the reward function is expressed as:
where ω is discount factor.
Security Situational Awareness
e proposed model considers the worst situation and evaluates the maximum damage of the system. e goal of the defense strategy is to maximize the defender's reward function for the maximum damage. e reward function for T * can be expressed as:
e security situational situation of IoT system at time τ can be obtained by summing up the reward functions of all the threats, which can expressed as:
where, B is the radix.
EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
e IoT has been widely applied in various elds [16] [17] [18] [19] , including smart home, healthcare, transport, environment monitoring, etc. We use smart home environment as a case to test the proposed model for SSA experimentally. We divide the devices into di erent regional subnets according to the communication protocols and model the heterogeneous subnets independently, then integrate these submodules together. Fig. 2 shows the IoT-enabled smart home environment, which includes a ZigBee subnet and a Wi-Fi subnet. A smart home hub is used to support the communications of Wi-Fi, ZigBee and Internet, which provides users a control panel to access IoT devices and control them remotely. e smart hub establishes a ZigBee subnet that allows home devices (such as smart meters, thermostats, temperature) to communicate with each other by using the ZigBee wireless protocol. Android tablet connects to both Wi-Fi network and ZigBee network. Smart TV connects to the Wi-Fi subnet. Both tablet and TV have access to the Internet through the smart hub.
Network description

Attack scenario
We assume the ultimate goal of an a acker is to damage the smart lock. Because the lock is isolated, an a acker cannot access it directly and only tries to perform in ltration a acks from other home devices. Two a ack scenarios are taken into consideration in the smart home.
Scenario 1: We take the TV as a gateway to a ack the smart home. Assuming that TV uses FFmpeg5.0. A ackers can exploit two types of vulnerabilities [20, 21] in media le formats supported by FFmpeg5.0 to run a ack code and gain the root privilege of the TV. Table 1 shows the information about the two vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities 
Vul Operation Impact
V t ab 1 Disrupt the conversion of Java bytecode 2 V t ab 2 Modify the AndroidManifest.xml le 2 V t ab 3 Obtain extended Device privileges 10 V t ab 4 Automatic sleep caused by low power 5
and Exposures (CVE) and their CVSS base scores. A er getting root privileges, they can use the TV as a portal to exploit vulnerabilities in other devices such as Android Tablet. Scenario 2: We take Android Tablet as a portal to a ack the smart home. Assuming that a ackers can write a malware to get the root permission of Android Tablet through utilizing three bugs [22] in the so ware and operating system. Table 2 shows the information about the three vulnerabilities of the Android Tablet. A er ge ing root privileges, they use the tablet to launch other a acks targeting the ZigBee subnet.
Experimental results and Analysis
We create an asset list for the smart home environment to construct the SCPN, and establish the Markov Game Model in SCPN, then evaluate the security situational of the smart home environment under the two a ack scenarios mentioned in section 3.2, respectively. Table 3 shows the states 
of nodes at time τ for T * . AssLevel denotes the importance of a asset in the SCPN and have 5 levels. rOR denotes whether the node is infected by T * . VulOR denotes whether a vulnerability exists in the node that can be exploited by T * . Speci cally, (N 3 , 5, 1, 1) denotes that the Tablet's value level is very high and vulnerabilities exist in the Tablet and can be exploited by T * . Table 4 shows the state of propagation paths at time τ for T * . PathLevel denotes the importance of a path in the SCPN and also have 5 levels. Exploitability denotes the probability of a threat transmission through the path. Specifically, (N 2 , N 1 , 5, 3 ) denotes that the propagation path between smart hub and Tablet is very important and utilizability of the path is medium. Fig.3 shows the parts of constructed SCPN in the smart environment for T * .
In order to facilitate the analysis of security situational value, we normalize the security situational values according to the min-max standardization. e results generated by the proposed model in the two a ack scenarios are shown in Fig.4 . e curves reveal the security situation trend overall, which provide a macro perspective of security situation in the smart home environment.
Furthermore, according to the comparison in Fig.4 , we can nd that a acking the TV has faster a ack e ect but lower impact than a acking the tablet. us, the a acker is more likely to choose the TV as the entry point.
e defender should protect the TV at rst in order to prevent the a acker from breaking into the network. Moreover, they can take TV as an origin and nd the potential a ack paths from the 
DISCUSSION
In this section, we clarify some relevant issues of our approach and discuss the limitation of this approach.
In this paper, we establish a SSA model in a complex IoTbased smart environment. e proposed model can form a macroscopic trend curve of security situation and help administrators make e ective defense decisions to mitigate the impact of potential a acks.
Compared with the previous models, (1) We chose SCPN to describe the IoT, because SCPN will be created dynamically which will make IoT-based smart environments highly interoperable and scalable, and provide IoT system a dynamical topology. (2) We divide the IoT devices into di erent regional subnets according to the communication protocols and model the heterogeneous subnets independently, then integrate these submodules together thus solving the problem about heterogeneity of IoT devices. (3) We stress the susceptibility of devices in this approach, for example, passive a acks caused by low power consumption are taken into consideration.
It is worth mentioning that although we validate the proposed model via two a ack scenarios in the smart home environment, our approach is portable that applies to other IoT environments through modifying the parameters of the model.
On the other hand, our approach considers the behaviors of both player and the dual e ects of propagation nodes and propagation paths in the a ack-defense process, so the state space would be large when players making decisions. Especially in complex IoT environment with numerous IoT nodes and propagation paths, the resources consume is huge. Hence, we will focus on reducing resources consume through combining the IoT vision with cloud computing.
CONCLUSION
Internet of ings (IoT) is enabling innovative applications in various domains. Due to its heterogeneous and wide-scale structure, it brings many new security issues. In this paper, a SCPN is constructed for a IoT-based smart home environment, and a Markov Game model is proposed for SSA in the de ned SCPN. All possible a ack paths are computed by the SCPN, and antagonistic behavior of both a ackers and defenders are dynamically taken into consideration according to Markov Game eory. We evaluated the proposed model in two a ack scenarios in a smart home environment.
e proposed model can form a macroscopic trend curve of security situation. According to the analysis of the results, we can nd the vulnerable devices and the potential a ack paths related to them in the SCPN, and then choose e ective strategies to protect the devices and mitigate the impact of potential a acks.
